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Abstract
This article investigates the cost effectiveness of cap-and-trade markets in the presence
of both political and market distortions. We create a model where dominant firms have
the ability to rent seek for a share of pollution permits as well as influence the market
equilibrium with their choice of permit exchange because of market power. We derive the
subgame-perfect equilibrium and show the interaction of these two distortions has conse-
quences for the resulting allocative efficiency of the market. We find that if the dominant
rent-seeking firms are all permit buyers (or a composition of buyers and sellers) then al-
locative efficiency is improved relative to the case without rent seeking; by contrast, if the
dominant rent-seeking firms are all permit sellers then allocative efficiency reduces.
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1 Introduction
Cap-and-trade markets have been justified as a cost-effective form of pollution control. The
varied scope of these markets can be observed within the European Union and United States,
among others.1 Although permit markets have performed relatively well, the implementation
of these schemes has raised a number of concerns. First, concern exists over the potential
market power of participating firms that may result in allocative inefficiency (e.g., Hintermann,
2017). Participating firms are normally sourced from a small number of concentrated industries
(such as the energy sector), which may increase the likelihood of market-power effects. Second,
it has been well documented that investments in rent-seeking efforts have been used to alter
the distribution of initial permit allocations (e.g., Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998; Ellerman
et al., 2007). Evidence exists for rent seeking over pollution permits within the US Acid Rain
Program (Joskow and Schmalensee, 1998) as well as the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (Ellerman et al., 2007). Thus, within contemporary cap-and-trade markets, there exists
the potential for both political and market distortions. Yet it is a priori unclear how these
distortions interact and the consequences for the cost effectiveness of pollution control.2
In this article we investigate the interactions between political and market distortions within
a cap-and-trade market. To achieve this, we create a model of a cap-and-trade market with large
dominant players and a competitive fringe of individually insignificant players. The dominant
players have the ability to: (i) rent seek for their initial allocation of permits; and (ii) choose
their level of permit exchange. We allow the contestability of the initial allocation of pollution
permits to vary from being non-contestable to fully contestable via a rent-seeking process. This
allows us to consider how alternative initial allocation mechanisms operate when there is a
difference in sensitivity towards rent seeking or, indeed, to consider alternative regulatory sys-
tems where the degree of rent seeking varies. We focus on the direct comparison between two
environments: when permits are either contestable or non-contestable. We show the resulting
allocative efficiency in a contestable environment depends on the composition of buyers and
sellers in the market: in the presence of active rent seeking, if the dominant firms are all permit
buyers (or a composition of buyers and sellers) then allocative efficiency increases above what
is observed in a non-contestable environment. Whereas allocative efficiency decreases relative
1While notable successes exists such as the US Acid Rain Program, Regional Greenhouse Gas initiative (RGGI),
and the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS), many schemes have been less successful (i.e., not imple-
mented), such as the Australian carbon pricing scheme.
2Although it is well known—from the the theory of second best (Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956)—that the addition
of another distortion may dampen the effects of a pre-existing distortion, the aim in this paper is different as we
focus on identifying the interactive mechanism between both distortions. Only then can we detail how overall
allocative efficiency is altered in the presence of both political and market distortions.
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to the non-contestable environment when the firms are all sellers.
The examination of market power within cap-and-trade markets is well developed. The
main branch of literature extends the work of Hahn (1984) that focuses on a dominant firm
with a competitive fringe of price-taking firms (e.g., Misiolek and Elder, 1989; von der Fehr,
1993; Westskog, 1996; Sartzetakis, 1997; Liski and Montero, 2011; Hintermann, 2011, 2016, 2017;
D’Amato et al., 2017).3 Hahn (1984) shows the dominant firm will select their permit holdings
to either decrease (increase) the permit price if they are a permit buyer (seller). Consequently,
the existence of market power results in increased costs of pollution control. Although the
literature on market power is well established, it does not extend the analysis to incorporate
rent-seeking activities. Yet, in a market with a concentrated set of dominant firms, it is plausible
that rent seeking would be more prevalent than in a perfectly competitive market. In this
article, we advance the literature on market power within cap-and-trade markets by allowing
the dominant firms to additionally rent seek for the initial permit allocation. Our analysis
shows that the allocative inefficiency normally associated with market power is significantly
altered by the presence of political distortions.
The rent-seeking literature focusing on cap-and-trade markets is also well established (Dijk-
stra, 1998; Malueg and Yates, 2006a; Lai, 2007, 2008; Hanley and MacKenzie, 2010; MacKenzie
and Ohndorf, 2012; MacKenzie, 2017).4 The majority of this literature focuses on rent seeking
for initial permit endowments in a competitive permit market.5 Usually rent seeking is mod-
eled as a Tullock (1980) contest where firms invest effort in order to obtain permit endowments,
the outcome being determined by their relative effort; thus, it is feasible to analyze the equi-
librium rent-seeking outcomes under alternative permit market settings. The issue of market
power within the permit market has, however, so far been ignored in these models. Yet to fully
understand the influence of rent seeking on the permit market it is important to understand
how the interaction between market-power distortions and rent seeking affect the operation of
the market. The main aim of this article is to provide the first comprehensive analysis of a cap-
and-trade market with dual distortionary effects. We analyze the subgame-perfect equilibrium
3A second branch of literature allows for all firms in the market to exert market power (Malueg and Yates, 2009;
Wirl, 2009; Lange, 2012; Haita, 2014; Dickson and MacKenzie, 2018). Again, it is shown that market power generates
allocative inefficiency within the market.
4Our focus here is on rent seeking associated with the distribution of permits and, therefore, the impact it has
on the working and efficiency of the market. Other distinct literature exists on lobbying over environmental policy
targets as well as the choice of policy instrument (see, for example, Buchanan and Tullock, 1975; Aidt, 1998, 2010).
For a comprehensive review of the literature see Oates and Portney (2003).
5Hanley and MacKenzie (2010) extend their basic perfectly competitive model to include one dominant firm.
Although they do obtain a rent-seeking equilibrium, they abstract from the interactions between rent seeking and
market exchange and, therefore, they do not consider the full (subgame-perfect) analysis of a cap-and-trade market.
As a consequence no conclusions can be drawn about how the interaction of political and market distortions can
affect the overall cost effectiveness of cap-and-trade schemes.
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of a cap-and-trade market with two distortionary effects and identify conditions where overall
allocative efficiency is either improved or reduced by investment in rent-seeking activity.
We therefore provide a model that bridges the gap between the rent-seeking and market-
power literatures. We follow the market-power literature by developing a competitive-fringe
framework with two dominant firms. Our model has two stages. In the first stage, the dom-
inant firms invest in rent-seeking effort in order to obtain a share of the initial allocation of
permits. Rent-seeking efforts are sunk costs, such as lobbying and persuasive activities, that al-
ter the distribution of the initial permit allocation. We develop this process as a strategic contest
(e.g., Tullock, 1980; Malueg and Yates, 2006b; Long, 2013; Dickson et al., 2018), where the equi-
librium share of permits is determined by a firm’s rent-seeking efforts relative to total outlays.
We allow firms’ initial permit allocations to be determined by a contestable component and
a non-contestable component thus allowing a continuum between these two extremes which
can capture the realistic institutional setups of initial allocation processes. While it is clear that
firms can rent seek for their permits, there can also be exogenous restrictions on the initial al-
location of permits. We introduce a parameter α that captures the degree of contestability. This
could represent the varying degrees of rent-seeking culture, such as how responsive bureau-
crats are to the rent-seeking process. Further, it could represent specific rules from legislation
that allow for the earmarking of permits or specific allocation mechanisms like auctioning or
grandfathering.6
Our major innovation is thus the investigation of permit markets in the presence of both
market and political distortions. This may provide insight to policymakers regarding the con-
testability of allocated permits and the likely consequences for the operation of the permit
market. The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is outlined. Section 3
characterizes the equilibrium of the game. Section 4 details the results that link rent-seeking
activity and market power to changes in allocative efficiency. Section 5 concludes. Proofs of the
theoretical results are contained in the appendix.
6Note that while it is unlikely that firms will invest rent-seeking effort to alter the distribution of permits in an
auction, effort may be used to capture the auction revenue (MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2012; MacKenzie, 2017). For
an analysis of auction and grandfathering aspects related to market power in the permit market see Álvarez and
André (2015). Further, the consequences of market power within a multi-unit auction process usually take the form
of lower clearing prices due to firms’ demand reduction (Khezr and MacKenzie, 2018a,b).
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2 The model
2.1 Preliminaries
Consider a pollution permit market with N + 2 regulated firms. Denote two dominant firms
by i, j ∈ {1, 2} and a competitive fringe of N firms denoted by index f .7 Denote a dominant
firm i’s pollution abatement by ai ≡ e− [ωi + xi], where e is the level of unconstrained emis-
sions (common to both firms), ωi is the initial allocation of permits and xi represents permits
transacted in the market; xi > 0 for purchases and xi < 0 for sales. The cost of abatement is
Ci(a) with Ci ′(·) > 0, Ci ′′(·) > 0, and Ci ′′′(·) = 0. We use analogous notation for the fringe
firms and impose the same assumptions on their cost functions. For the two dominant firms
we assume that C1(0) = C2(0) and that C1′′(a) ≥ C2′′(a) ∀a, which combined implies that firm
1 has a weakly higher marginal abatement cost than firm 2 for all levels of abatement.
Our framework consists of two stages. In Stage 1, the dominant firms invest in rent-seeking
effort in order to alter their initial permit allocation from the regulator. In Stage 2, the initial
permit allocations become common knowledge and firms subsequently engage in permit ex-
change in the presence of a competitive fringe of small firms. The solution concept we use in
this dynamic game of complete information is subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Stage 1: Rent seeking over pollution permits
In Stage 1 each dominant firm chooses a level of rent-seeking effort ki ≥ 0 in order to influence
their initial permit allocation. We follow the rent-seeking literature and assume the cost of
rent seeking is vi(k) with vi ′(·) > 0, vi ′′(·) = 0, and vi ′(0) = 0. Let Ω denote the number of
permits available for allocation among the two dominant firms. To allow for a wide variety of
institutional settings, we allow the dominant firms’ initial permit allocation to be based on both
contestable and non-contestable components. To achieve this, denote by α ∈ [0, 1] the share ofΩ
that can be contested via rent-seeking. Formally, then, firm i’s initial permit allocation ωi(ki, kj)
is given by
ωi(ki, kj) = [1− α]Ω
2
+ α
ki
ki + kj
Ω for i = 1, 2; i 6= j. (1)
Note that ωi(ki, kj) + ω j(ki, kj) = Ω and since each fringe firm exogenously receives ω f , the
total emissions cap is Nω f +Ω.
From (1) the first term illustrates the non-contestable component of pollution permits al-
7Note that our focus on two dominant firms is for simplicity of exposition, but the analysis can be logically
extended to incorporate several large firms.
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located to firm i and the second term illustrates the permits obtained via rent seeking. The
contestable component follows the convention within the rent-seeking literature that uses a
Tullock contest to model the influence of political pressure (Dickson et al., 2018). As can be ob-
served from (1), firm i’s share of contestable permits is based on their rent-seeking effort relative
to total outlays of effort. Note that variations of α can represent many important institutional
applications. First it can represent the political and regulatory culture of how rent seeking af-
fects regulatory outcomes. Second, it could represent alternative initial allocation mechanisms
with varying degrees of potential contestability. For example, under auctioned permits it is less
likely that rent seeking will influence the distribution of permits which instead will be based
on the auction rules (so α may be rather small) whereas rent seeking may be more severe under
alternative mechanisms, such as a grandfathered (free allocation) approach (see, for example,
MacKenzie and Ohndorf, 2012).
2.3 Stage 2: Permit exchange
In Stage 2, once initial permit allocations become common knowledge, the dominant firms
exchange permits within a competitive-fringe model. Market clearing requires
xi + xj + Nx f = 0.
If p is the price of permits, each firm in the competitive fringe will seek to minimize the cost of
abatement to solve:
min
x f
C f (e− [ω f + x f ]) + px f
and therefore equilibrium demand from the fringe will satisfy:
x˜ f (p) = {x f : C f ′(e− [ω f + x f ]) = p}. (2)
As such, market clearing requires the price to be set such that:
xi + xj + Nx˜ f (p) = 0
and we write
p˜(xi + xj) = x˜ f−1
(
− x
i + xj
N
)
.
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It follows that
p˜′(xi + xj) = − 1
N
1
x˜ f ′
=
C f ′′(e− [ω f + x˜ f ( p˜(xi + xj))])
N
> 0,
which shows that the equilibrium permit price is increasing in the dominant firms’ permit
purchases.8
Each of the two dominant firms cares about their overall cost of emissions, which includes
their abatement cost taking into account the effect of their actions on the permit price and the
cost of rent seeking. For firm i this cost takes the form:
Ci(e− [ωi(ki, kj) + xi]) + xi p˜(xi + xj) + vi(ki) for i = 1, 2, i 6= j. (3)
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We now start the equilibrium analysis of the game using backward induction to identify the
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In particular, we first derive the Nash equilibrium of the permit
market exchange given the choice of rent-seeking efforts from Stage 1, and then turn attention
to the rent-seeking equilibrium.
3.1 Stage 2: permit market choices
In a Nash equilibrium of the Stage 2 game, each firm can be seen as choosing their permit
allocation to minimize the cost detailed in (3). The solution to this, which yields each firm’s
reaction function, is given by
x˜i(xj;ωi(α; ki, kj)) =
{
xi : −Ci ′(e− [ωi(α; ki, kj) + xi]) + p˜(xi + xj) + xi p˜′(xi + xj) = 0
}
, (4)
subject to the second-order condition being satisfied. Let us define l˜i(xi, xj;ωi(α; ki, kj)) as the
left-hand side of the first-order condition:
l˜i(xi, xj;ωi(α; ki, kj)) ≡ −Ci ′(e− [ωi(α; ki, kj) + xi]) + p˜(xi + xj) + xi p˜′(xi + xj). (5)
8Note that since C f ′′′ = 0, p˜′′ = 0, so inverse demand is linear.
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Before we engage in a discussion of the nature of the equilibrium, let us make the preliminary
observations that9
l˜ixi = C
i ′′ + 2p˜′ > 0,
l˜ixj = p˜
′ > 0,
l˜iki = l˜
i
ωiω
i
ki = C
i ′′ωiki > 0,
l˜ikj = l˜
i
ωiω
i
kj = C
i ′′ωikj < 0,
where ωiki =
kj
[ki+kj]2 αΩ and ω
i
kj = − k
i
[ki+kj]2 αΩ. Noting l˜
i
xi > 0 allows us to conclude that the
second-order condition is indeed satisfied so the reaction function is identified by (4).
To understand how the dominant firms interact, we use implicit differentiation of (4) to
deduce the slope of the reaction function:
x˜ixj = −
l˜ixj
l˜ixi
= − p˜
′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
∈ (−1/2, 0), (6)
so this is a game of strategic substitutes with downward-sloping reaction functions. Note that
when xi = 0, l˜i(0, xj;ωi(α; ki, kj)) = −Ci ′(ei −ωi(α; ki, k j)) + p˜(xj). Recalling that l˜ixi > 0, if this
is greater than zero then x˜i will be negative (i will be a seller of permits) for this given xj; while
if it is less than zero then x˜i will be positive (i will be a buyer of permits). In terms of firm i’s
reaction function, the point at which l˜i(0, xj;ωi(α; ki, kj)) = 0 determines where firm i’s reaction
function crosses the horizontal axis, i.e., the xj such that Ci ′(ei − [ωi(α; ki, k j) + xi]) = p˜(xj).
Given its negative slope, for any xj smaller than this, firm i will be a buyer of permits, while
for any xj larger, firm i will be a seller. Figure 1 illustrates one possible example where firm i
is a net permit seller in the equilibrium whereas firm j is net buyer of permits.
We now derive the unique Nash equilibrium of permit exchange and provide comparative
statics of how the equilibrium changes relative to endowments and rent-seeking effort chosen
in Stage 1.
Proposition 1. Suppose α > 0, then for any k1, k2 > 0 there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in
the permit market that we denote by {x1∗(k1, k2), x2∗(k1, k2)} with the property that dxi∗dωi < 0 and
consequently
xi∗ki < 0, x
i∗
kj > 0 for i = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Proposition 1 shows that as a firm’s permit endowment increases they decrease their pur-
9By convention, for a function of many variables we use subscripts to denote the derivative with respect to the
variable highlighted; for functions of single variables we use ′s to indicate derivatives.
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x j
xi
x˜ j(xi)
x˜i(x j)
xi∗
x j∗
Figure 1: Reaction functions where, in equilibrium, firm i is a permit seller and firm j is a permit buyer.
chase of permits, or sell more permits. As such, as a firm’s rent seeking increases this—through
a channel of obtaining more permits as ωiki > 0—results in a decrease in permit purchase or
increase in permits sold. By contrast, increased rent-seeking activity from a rival results in
an increase in permit purchases or reduction in permits sold, as their rival’s actions imply a
reduction in the allocation of permits to the firm in question.
It is interesting to note that when a firm engages in more rent seeking in the first stage,
which ceteris paribus gives them more permits, there is an offsetting reduction in permit market
transactions in the second stage. However, overall, an increase in rent seeking will result in an
increase in the number of permits a firm holds in equilibrium, since
ωiki︸︷︷︸
>0
+ xi∗ki︸︷︷︸
<0
=
kj
[ki+kj]2 αΩ
[Ci ′′ + 2p˜′][Cj ′′ + 2p˜′]
[ p˜′Cj ′′ + 4[ p˜′]2] > 0. (7)
Thus it is clear that more rent seeking by a firm leads to less pollution abatement by that firm.
Note that in the permit-market equilibrium, we could either have both firms on one side of
the market, or firms on different sides of the market. From the first-order condition presented
in (4) observe that if Ci ′ > p˜∗ in equilibrium then it must be the case that xi∗ > 0 and if Ci ′ < p˜∗
in equilibrium then it must be the case that xi∗ < 0. Thus, depending on the relationship
between the equilibrium levels of Ci ′, Cj ′, and p˜∗, we could have both firms on the same side
of the market (if both firms equilibrium marginal abatement costs are larger, or smaller, than
the equilibrium permit price), or firms on opposite sides of the market, in which case our
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assumption that firm 1 always has a larger abatement cost than firm 2 will imply it is firm 1
that will be the buyer of permits while firm 2 will be the seller of permits.
3.2 Stage 1: rent-seeking choices
In this subsection, we analyze the equilibrium rent-seeking choices of the dominant firms,
accounting for the second-stage permit-market equilibrium. Each firm can be seen as choosing
their rent-seeking effort to minimize the overall cost of emissions that include abatement costs,
the net cost of permit purchases, and rent-seeking costs. Firm i’s problem is therefore to
min
ki≥0
Ci(e− [ωi(ki, kj) + xi∗(ki, kj)]) + xi∗(ki, kj) p˜(xi∗(ki, kj) + xj∗(ki, kj)) + vi(ki).
For ease of notation, define the cost of emissions as
Gi(ki, kj) = Ci(e− [ωi(ki, kj) + xi∗(ki, kj)]) + xi∗(ki, kj) p˜(xi∗(ki, kj) + xj∗(ki, kj)).
As such, firm i’s reaction function will take the form
kˆi(kj) = {ki : li(ki, kj) ≡ Giki(ki, kj) + vi ′(ki) = 0}.
The effect of increasing rent-seeking effort on the cost of emissions is given by
Giki =
∂Gi
∂ki
+
∂Gi
∂xi∗
xi∗ki +
∂Gi
∂xj∗
xj∗ki .
From the first-order optimality condition in Stage 2 (see (4)), ∂G
i
∂xi∗ = 0. For tractability, we
restrict our attention to settings where, while each firm anticipates the effect of its rent-seeking
effort on its own permit market activity—it takes the permit market activity of the other firm
as given.10 Thus noting that ∂G
i
∂ki = −Ci ′(ei − [ωi(ki, kj) + xi∗])ωiki , the expression for firm i’s
reaction function simplifies to
kˆi(kj) =
{
ki : li(ki, kj) ≡ −Ci ′
(
ei −
[
[1− α]Ω
2
+
ki
ki + kj
αΩ+ xi∗(ki, kj)
])
kj
[ki + kj]2
αΩ
+ vi ′(ki) = 0
}
. (8)
10This appeals to the conventional assumption of zero conjectural variation in Nash equilibrium—each player
makes their choice assuming the action of the other player is fixed—which is adapted so that the actions we are
assuming are fixed occur at a later stage (i.e., the firm anticipates this action, but doesn’t anticipate it changing, so
xj∗ki = 0).
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Rather than work with reaction functions directly—whose properties are difficult to determine—
we instead take an aggregative games approach and consider the behavior of each individual
consistent with an equilibrium in which the aggregate rent-seeking effort, K ≡ ki + kj, takes
a particular value (the aggregative games approach is detailed in the proof of Proposition 2
within the appendix). We work with expressions that consider an individual’s share of the
aggregate rent-seeking effort, σi ≡ ki/K, consistent with equilibrium (as opposed to the level)
because identifying the equilibrium becomes straightforward as consistency of the aggregate
rent-seeking effort requires individuals to have shares with this aggregate effort that sum to 1.
As such, the properties of the aggregation of share functions are instructive as to the existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium.
We utilize expression (8) in the following proposition that demonstrates that there is a
unique equilibrium in rent-seeking choices in which both firms are active in rent seeking.
Proposition 2. For any α > 0, there is a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium with first-stage
rent-seeking efforts k1∗, k2∗ > 0.
To proceed with the analysis, let us impose some structure on the nature of firms. In
particular, suppose that the marginal cost of rent seeking (vi ′) is the same for each firm (as is
standard within the rent-seeking literature11), and that firm 1—who has the higher marginal
abatement cost for a given level of abatement—always values the outcome of rent-seeking more
than firm 2 (as we would intuitively expect). A sufficient condition for this latter supposition is
C1′(0) > C2′(e), in which case firm 1 always has a higher marginal abatement cost than firm 2
regardless of the level of abatement of each firm. We instead assume a much weaker condition
as follows:
Assumption 1. For combinations of σ1, σ2 and K where the first-order conditions are satisfied,
C1′(e− [[1− α]Ω
2
+ σ1αΩ+ x1∗(σ1K, [1− σ1]K)]) >
C2′(e− [[1− α]Ω
2
+ σ2αΩ+ x2∗(σ2K, [1− σ2]K)]).
With this structure on the nature of firms, we can then derive the composition of rent
seeking between the dominant firms.
Proposition 3. Suppose v1′(·) = v2′(·) and Assumption 1 is satisfied. Then in the unique subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium, k1∗ > k2∗.
11Identical marginal costs of rent seeking can be interpreted as each firm expending a monetary cost to influence
the initial endowment of pollution permits (Congleton et al., 2008). Note that firms continue to have heterogeneous
values of the outcome of the rent-seeking process.
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Proposition 3 is consistent with the rent-seeking literature in that if firm 1 values the out-
come of rent seeking more then they also have a higher level of rent-seeking effort in equilib-
rium. Having established the composition of rent-seeking effort between the dominant firms,
we now turn to investigate how the degree of permit contestability influences the cost effec-
tiveness of the permit market.
4 The effect of permit contestability on allocative efficiency
In the previous section, we derived both the permit market and rent-seeking equilibrium of
the game. In this section, our focus is on how permit contestability can influence the allocative
efficiency of a permit market with pre-existing market-power distortions. To begin, let us start
by examining the case where dominant firms are symmetric.
Proposition 4. If dominant firms are symmetric then the permit market efficiency is independent of
permit contestability.
Proposition 4 shows that if the dominant firms are symmetric then the contestability does
not alter the allocative efficiency in the market. When dominant firms are symmetric then
their rent-seeking activity is identical, which results in an equal sharing of the initial permit
allocation. Thus firm i’s initial permit allocation is given by
ωi(ki, kj) = [1− α]Ω
2
+ α
Ω
2
=
Ω
2
for i = 1, 2; i 6= j.
and is independent of α, the contestability of initial permit allocation. We now turn to the case
where the dominant firms are asymmetric.
Proposition 5. Allocative inefficiency, as measured by [
∣∣x1∗∣∣ + ∣∣x2∗∣∣] p˜′, is lower in the presence of
active rent seeking if both firms are buyers of permits on the market, or firm 1 is a buyer and firm 2 is a
seller, but is higher if both firms are sellers on the market.
Proposition 5 shows that how rent seeking and market power interact varies depending on
the composition of the dominant firms. If all dominant firms are net permit buyers then the
existence of contestable permits—and thus the existence of rent seeking over the distribution
of permits—will increase the allocative efficiency of the market relative to case where permits
are non-contestable. Thus contestability can improve the cost effectiveness of a permit market
with market-power distortions. When the dominant firms are buyers, they must have relatively
high abatement costs. With the ability to rent seek, firm 1 has more influence on their initial
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endowment. Intuitively the rent-seeking process allows the relatively high cost firm 1 to move
towards an initial endowment that is their more preferred, which results in less distortionary
behavior on the market as it purchases less permits. This offsets an increase in permit purchase
from firm 2 that now obtains less initial permit endowment when permits are distributed using
the rent-seeking process. Note that these market outcomes continue to hold even when firm 2 is
a net seller: the dominance of firm 1’s reduction in permit purchase fully offsets any distortion
created by firm 2’s increase in permits sold.
If all dominant firms are permit sellers in the market then Proposition 5 shows permit
contestability has an adverse effect on permit market allocative efficiency. Now, if firms acquire
the ability to rent seek then an increased initial endowment for the highest cost firm 1 will result
in the ability of that firm to use its dominant position to sell more permits (i.e., x1∗ becomes
more negative) offsetting any reduction in permits sold by firm 2 as a net seller of permits.
For policymakers, then, it is important to realize that in a realistic environment—in which
there exists rent seeking and market power—the degree of cost effectiveness in pollution control
relies on the market composition of dominant players. Markets that experience dominant net
permit sellers may therefore be less cost effective than if the dominant firms were in more
diverse positions within the market.
5 Concluding remarks
The purpose of this article is to investigate how the interaction of political and market dis-
tortions affect the cost effectiveness of cap-and-trade markets. We develop a two-stage permit
market model where dominant firms, first, have the ability to invest in rent-seeking effort to
obtain an initial allocation of permits and then, second, choose their level of permit exchange.
We derive the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game.
In the permit market, for a given initial allocation of permits, a unique equilibrium exists
where equilibrium permit holdings are decreasing (purchasing less; selling more) in the level
of the initial allocation. Further, a dominant firm’s equilibrium permit holdings decrease in the
firms level of rent seeking. We show that if a dominant firm invests in rent seeking they increase
their permit endowment but there is also an offsetting reduction in permit transactions. We
show the net effect is positive: rent seeking will result in less individual pollution abatement.
In the rent-seeking stage, we derive the unique equilibrium accounting for the second-stage
permit market exchange.
Our main focus is whether permit contestability—how vulnerable the initial allocation of
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permits is to rent seeking—affects the allocative efficiency of the market. In a market with pre-
existing market-power issues, we compare how allocative efficiency is altered when permits
become contestable. We show how the cost effectiveness of the market is altered depends on the
permit exchange activity of the dominant firms. In particular, we show that if dominant firms
are permit buyers in equilibrium (or a mixture of buyer and seller) then allocative efficiency
can actually improve relative to the conventional market-power efficiency problems. Whereas
if all dominant firms are sellers then allocative efficiency is reduced.
The main aim of this article is to analyze how rent-seeking activity over the initial distribu-
tion of permits affects the cost effectiveness of a permit market under the presence of market
power. Consequently, we have abstracted from the social cost of rent seeking. To include this
note that the conventional methodology assumes that, in terms of social welfare, there are both
losses associated with higher pollution control costs as well as the social cost of rent seeking
(e.g., MacKenzie, 2017). As we have observed, rent-seeking activity can reduce the total pollu-
tion control costs from a situation with market power. To showcase the consequences for social
welfare note that the key determinant is the social planner’s (ad hoc) weights on pollution
costs and rent seeking costs. Clearly, more weight on pollution abatement costs (and less on
rent seeking) may result in improvements of social welfare and vice versa. As such, only a
normative approach can be taken with limited insight. In contrast, our positive analysis shows
that the cost effectiveness of a permit market—with both political and market distortions—is
determined by the composition of market participants.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Since reaction functions have a slope whose absolute value is less than
1 they will intersect once and only once, which identifies the unique Nash equilibrium that
we denote by {x1∗(k1, k2), x2∗(k1, k2)}: for any ki, kj there is a unique Nash equilibrium in the
second stage subgame. Implicit differentiation of the first-order condition (4) allows us to
understand the effect of a change in the permit endowment on the reaction function:
x˜iωi = −
l˜i
ωi
l˜ixi
= − C
i ′′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
< 0. (9)
So if firm i is a buyer of permits it buys fewer with a larger endowment, and if it is a seller a
larger endowment means it will sell more. Considering how equilibrium permit transactions
change, we note that this can be decomposed into the direct and strategic effects:
dxi∗
dωi
= x˜iωi + x˜
i
xj x˜
j
xi x˜
i
ωi
= x˜iωi [1+ x˜
i
xj x˜
j
xi ].
Since this is a game of strategic substitutes, x˜ixj x˜
j
xi > 0, which allows us to conclude that
dxi∗
dωi < 0.
Turning now to understand the effect of a change in ki on the permit-market equilibrium,
we know that
xi∗ki = x˜
i
ωiω
i
ki + x˜
i
xj x˜
j
ω j
ω
j
ki .
We can obtain
ωiki =
kj
[ki + kj]2
αΩ,
x˜ixj = −
l˜ixj
l˜ixi
= − p˜
′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
, and
ω
j
ki = −
kj
[ki + kj]2
αΩ.
As such, it follows that
xi∗ki = −
kj
[ki+kj]2 αΩ
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
[Ci ′′ +
Cj ′′ p˜′
Cj ′′ + 2p˜′
] < 0.
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Similarly, for firm j:
xj∗ki = x˜
j
ω j
ω
j
ki + x˜
j
xi x˜
i
ωiω
i
ki ,
which is given by:
xj∗ki =
kj
[ki+kj]2 αΩ
Cj ′′ + 2p˜′
[Cj ′′ +
Ci ′′ p˜′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
] > 0.
Proof or Proposition 2. Recall from (8) the expression for firm i’s reaction function. First, we
replace kj with K − ki in this expression, where K ≡ ki + kj is the aggregate rent-seeking ef-
fort. This would give firm i’s rent-seeking effort consistent with an equilibrium in which the
aggregate rent-seeking effort is K. But rather than working with levels, we want to work with
shares of the aggregate effort, and so we take an additional step by replacing ki with σiK where
σi ≡ ki/K represents firm i’s share of the aggregate rent-seeking effort. Firm i’s share function
consequently takes the form:
si(K) =
{
σi : li(σiK, [1− σi]K) ≡
− Ci ′
(
ei −
[
[1− α]Ω
2
+ σiαΩ+ xi∗(σiK, [1− σi]K)
])
[1− σi]αΩ
K
+ vi ′(σiK) = 0
}
.
We want to understand the properties of these share functions, and we begin by under-
standing how share functions vary with K. Using the implicit function theorem,
siK = −
dli
dK
dli
dσi
.
Before we deduce what this expression is, we need some preliminary observations. First,
recall that since vi ′′ = 0 the marginal cost of rent seeking in the above expression is constant.
Next, note that since we can write equilibrium permit market actions as xi∗(σiK, [1− σi]K),
dxi∗
dσi
= K[xi∗ki − xi∗kj ] and
dxi∗
dK
= σixi∗ki + [1− σi]xi∗kj .
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Recalling from the proof of Proposition 1 that
xi∗ki = −[1− σi]
αΩ
K
Ci ′′ + C
j ′′ p˜′
Cj ′′+2p˜′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
and
xi∗kj = σ
i αΩ
K
Ci ′′ + C
j ′′ p˜′
Cj ′′+2p˜′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
allows us to deduce, following simplification, that
dxi∗
dσi
= −αΩ
Ci ′′ + C
j ′′ p˜′
Cj ′′+2p˜′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
and
dxi∗
dK
= 0.
We can now deduce that
dli
dσi
=
αΩ
K
[
[1− σi]Ci ′′[αΩ+ dx
i∗
dσi
] + Ci ′
]
,
and in this expression
αΩ+
dxi∗
dσi
= αΩ
1− Ci ′′ + Cj ′′ p˜′Cj ′′+2p˜′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′

=
αΩ p˜′
[Ci ′′ = 2p˜′][Cj ′′ + 2p˜′]
[Cj ′′ + 4p˜′] > 0,
following some simplification. Note also that this implies the first-order condition is both
necessary and sufficient in identifying optimal actions.
In addition,
dli
dK
= [1− σi]αΩ
K
Ci ′′
dxi∗
dK
+ Ci ′[1− σi]αΩ
K2
= Ci ′[1− σi]αΩ
K2
> 0
as dx
i∗
dK = 0 from above. As such, this allows us to conclude that s
i
K < 0, so individual share
functions are strictly decreasing in the aggregate rent-seeking effort.
When Ci ′(ei − [[1 − α]Ω2 + σiαΩ + xi∗(σiK, [1 − σi]K)])[1 − σi] αΩK and vi ′(σiK) are plotted
as functions of σi, the intersection of these for a given K identifies the value of the share
function for that K. Recall that vi ′(σiK) is of course constant in σi, and our deductions above
imply the first function is decreasing in both σi and K. The function Ci ′(ei − [[1 − α]Ω2 +
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σiαΩ + xi∗(σiK, [1 − σi]K)])[1 − σi] αΩK takes the value of zero when σi = 1, and the value
Ci ′(ei − [[1 − α]Ω2 + xi∗(0, K)]) αΩK when σi = 0. If K is such that this exceeds vi ′(σiK) then
there will be a positive solution and the share function will be positive. But if K is such
that this is less than vi ′(σiK) the share function will take the value of zero. Let us define
K¯i as the value of K such that Ci ′(ei − [[1 − α]Ω2 + xi∗(0, K)]) αΩK = vi ′(0), then the fact that
Ci ′(ei − [[1− α]Ω2 + σiαΩ + xi∗(σiK, [1− σi]K)])[1− σi] αΩK is decreasing in K implies that the
share function will be positive for all K < K¯i and zero for all K ≥ K¯i. In addition, note that as
K → 0 the function Ci ′(ei − [[1− α]Ω2 + σiαΩ+ xi∗(σiK, [1− σi]K)])[1− σi] αΩK increases without
bound for all σi, and we therefore deduce that si(K)→ 1 as K → 0. To summarize: each firm’s
share function takes the value of 1 when K is arbitrarily close to zero, it is strictly decreasing in
K > 0 and is equal to zero for all K > K¯i.
We now seek to identify a Nash equilibrium. This requires the sum of individual rent-
seeking efforts to be equal to the aggregate rent-seeking effort, or, dividing both sides of this
equation by the aggregate rent-seeking effort, for the sum of share functions to be equal to 1.
Again, we sum the two share functions up and find the value of K where the sum of share
functions is equal to 1. Since the sum of share functions exceeds 1 when K is arbitrarily small, is
less than one when K = mini{K¯i} (since one firm’s share function is zero and the other’s is less
than one by definition), and is strictly decreasing in K, the intermediate value theorem implies
there is a unique K∗ ∈ (0, mini{K¯i}) at which si(K∗) + sj(K∗) = 1, and therefore a unique Nash
equilibrium in which the shares of the two players are si∗ = si(K∗) and sj∗ = sj(K∗) and their
rent-seeking efforts are ki∗ = K∗si∗ > 0 and kj∗ = K∗sj∗ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. By Assumption 1,
C1′
(
e1 −
[
[1− α]Ω
2
+ σαΩ+ x1∗(σK, [1− σ]K)
])
>
C2′
(
e2 −
[
[1− α]Ω
2
+ σαΩ+ x2∗(σK, [1− σ]K)
])
and since v1′(·) = v2′(·) this implies that firm 1’s share function, as identified by the level of σ
where C1′(e1 − [[1− α]Ω2 + σαΩ+ x1∗(σK, [1− σ]K)])[1− σ] αΩK = vi
′
(σK) will always be larger
than that of firm 2 which is identified by the analogous condition. As such, for any K where
they are both defined, s1(K) > s2(K), which therefore implies k1∗ = K∗s1(K∗) > K∗s2(K∗) =
k2∗.
Proof of Proposition 4. If Ci ′′ = Cj ′′ then ki∗ = kj∗ and consequently ωi(ki∗, kj∗) = [1− α]Ω2 +
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α k
i∗
ki∗+kj∗Ω =
Ω
2 for i = 1, 2. As such, the equilibrium in the permit market x
i∗, xj∗ doesn’t depend
on α, so inefficiency doesn’t depend on α. If α increases, which increases the contestability of
permits in the mixed sharing rule, the equilibrium still awards each firm with 1/2 of αΩ, hence
each individual ωi remains constant.
Proof of Proposition 5. We want to compare the case of no contestability with the case where
permits are contestable through rent seeking prior to permit exchange. With α = 0, it follows
that ωi = Ω2 . With α > 0, we need to consider the contest equilibrium. As shown in Proposition
3, under Assumption 1 k1∗ > k2∗ and therefore,
ω1(k1∗, k2∗) = [1− α]Ω
2
+
k1∗
k1∗ + k2∗
αΩ >
Ω
2
,
ω2(k1∗, k2∗) = [1− α]Ω
2
+
k2∗
k1∗ + k2∗
αΩ <
Ω
2
.
Note that12 ω1(k1∗, k2∗)− Ω2 = Ω2 − ω2(k1∗, k2∗), so when comparing endowments with α > 0
with those when α = 0 we can write ∆ω1 = −∆ω2. Given our earlier results on how xi∗
changes with ωi in Proposition 1, we can therefore directly conclude, abusing notation slightly,
that:
x1∗
∣∣∣
α>0
< x1∗
∣∣∣
α=0
x2∗
∣∣
α>0 > x
2∗∣∣
α=0 .
Now, what we are interested in is the effect of rent seeking on the allocative efficiency of the
market, which is given by [
∣∣x1∗∣∣+ ∣∣x2∗∣∣] p˜′.13 Since p˜′ is a constant we focus on [∣∣x1∗∣∣+ ∣∣x2∗∣∣],
There are three cases to consider:
1. Firm 1 is a buyer of permits and firm 2 is a seller of permits14;
2. Both firms are buyers of permits;
3. Both firms are sellers of permits.
12To see this, note that since k
2
k1+k2 = 1− k
1
k1+k2 we can write ω
2 = [1− α]Ω2 +
[
1− k1k1+k2
]
αΩ. As such, Ω2 −
ω2(k1∗, k2∗) = −αΩ2 + k
1∗
k1∗+k2∗ αΩ, which is precisely ω
1(k1∗, k2∗)− Ω2 .
13Allocative efficiency following trade in the permit market is given by the sum of the differences between the
equilibrium marginal abatement cost and the price. From the first-order condition (4), for each dominant firm this
is given by xi∗ p˜′, and for the fringe firms it is zero, hence our focus on the stated expression.
14The reverse cannot be true under Assumption 1. Suppose, by contrast, that x1∗ < 0 < x2∗. Then p˜∗ + x1∗ p˜∗′ <
p˜∗ + x2∗ p˜∗′ but then the stage 2 first-order conditions imply C1′(e1 − [ω1∗ + x1∗]) < C2′(e2 − [ω2∗ + x2∗]), but this
is in direct contradiction to Assumption 1.
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Case 1. If firm 1 is a buyer then x1∗ > 0 and so decreases with α > 0; If firm 2 is a seller
then x2∗ < 0 and so gets less negative when α > 0. As such x1∗ +
∣∣x2∗∣∣ ∣∣∣∣
α>0
< x1∗ +
∣∣x2∗∣∣ ∣∣∣∣
α=0
so allocative inefficiency decreases in the presence of rent seeking.
Case 2. If firm 1 is a buyer x1∗ > 0 and so decreases when α > 0; and if firm 2 is a buyer
x2∗ > 0 also increases when α > 0. The overall effect, assuming small changes, is given by:
dx1∗ + dx2∗ = x1∗ω1 dω
1 + x2∗ω2 dω
2.
As noted previously dω1 = −dω2, and therefore
dx1∗ + dx2∗ = [x1∗ω1 − x2∗ω2 ]dω1 where dω1 > 0.
Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that dx
i∗
dωi = x˜
i
ωi
[1+ x˜ixj x˜
j
xi ]. As such,
dx1∗ + dx2∗ = [x˜1ω1 − x˜2ω2 ][1+ x˜ixj x˜
j
xi ]dω
1.
Recall further that
xi∗ωi = −
Ci ′′
Ci ′′ + 2p˜′
,
then the term in the first square brackets is
[
C1′′
C1′′ + 2p˜′
− C
2′′
C2′′ + 2p˜′
]
< 0
implying dx1∗ + dx2∗ < 0. Again allocative inefficiency decreases in the presence of rent seek-
ing.
Case 3. If firm 1 and 2 are both sellers of permits then x1∗ < 0 and x2∗ < 0, so x1∗ gets more
negative and x2∗ gets less negative. The overall effect, again assuming small changes is
∣∣∣dx1∗∣∣∣+ ∣∣dx2∗∣∣ = ∣∣∣x1∗ω1 ∣∣∣ dω1 + ∣∣x2∗ω2 ∣∣ dω2
=
[∣∣∣x1∗ω1 ∣∣∣− ∣∣x2∗ω2 ∣∣] dω1
=
[
C1′′
C1′′ + 2p˜′
− C
2′′
C2′′ + 2p˜′
]
dω1 > 0
In this case, allocative inefficiency increases in the presence of rent seeking.
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